Fact Sheet on Mubarak Trial and Legal Status

New Article Submission

Thank you for your interest in Jadaliyya. We welcome all submissions. The most significant requirement is for Jadaliyya submissions to be analytically compelling and offer a perspective or argument that has not been covered at length either on Jadaliyya or elsewhere. Because of the volume of submissions, well-written pieces are prioritized. Length is flexible, 1000 to 2500 words is the average range. However, we will accept longer pieces. Once submitted, several members of the editorial committee will review your piece and one of them will inform you of the decision.
Author Details
Article Details
Select Countries
Select Keywords
Select Topics
Only RTF, Word, and Pages documents accepted.

Recommended image size: 762x800 px

Location of each image should be indicated in the text of the article via a square bracket caption that includes: (1) a description of the image; (2) the photographer/designer and source of the image. Please note we only use images you as the author have the right to use, which usually means those of your own creation or those published under Creative Commons. Alternatively, you need specific permission from the copyright holder.
Please read the Release Form and provide an electronic signature [your full name] below to confirm that you accept its terms
Required
Hyperlink words in your article if they refer to links on the internet. We encourage more, rather than less, links (try to avoid footnotes—embed them as hyperlinks if possible)

Article added successfully.

Pages Menu BETA
Aug 22, 2013 Egypt
[Logo of Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR). Image from eipr.org] [Logo of Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR). Image from eipr.org]

Fact Sheet on Mubarak Trial and Legal Status

By : Jadaliyya Reports

[The following fact sheet was issued by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) on 21 August 2013.]

What were the charges against Mubarak?

The Public Prosecution has leveled official charges at Mubarak and others in four cases so far:

  1. The killing of demonstrators in 2011, influence peddling and profiting from the export of gas to Israel.
  2. Illicit gain (his wealth is not commensurate with his income).
  3. Presidential palaces case (he appropriated for himself, his wife Suzanne Thabet and his sons Alaa and Gamal funds allocated annually for the upkeep of the presidential palaces).
  4. Receipt of gifts from state-owned press institutions.
     

Have judgments been issued against Mubarak in any of these cases?

The cases involving illicit gain, the presidential palaces, and the receipt of gifts from press institutions are still pending; Mubarak has not yet been acquitted or convicted in these cases.

For the charge of killing demonstrators, he was sentenced to life imprisonment on 2 June 2012. Following an appeal, the Court of Cassation overturned the judgment on 13 January 2013, and the retrial is currently underway.

Is Mubarak still held on remand in connection with any of these cases?

No. In the killing of demonstrators case, Mubarak spent two years in pretrial detention, the maximum period allowed under the Code of Criminal Procedure for defendants accused of committing a crime that carries the death penalty. He received a release order in this case on 15 April 2013, while being held in connection with the other corruption cases.

On 20 June 2013, during the tenure of Mohamed Morsi, a court order was issued for Mubarak’s release from pretrial detention in the illicit gains case. The Public Prosecution appealed this order, but the Court of Appeals rejected the appeal and upheld the release.

On 19 August 2013, another court order was issued for Mubarak’s release in connection with the presidential palaces case, although his children remain in detention in connection with this case.

At this point, Mubarak was held only for allegedly receiving gifts from press institutions. The value of the gifts was repaid, after which his lawyers contested the pretrial detention order. That petition was heard today and the court ordered his release.

Does this mean Mubarak will be released?

Yes. After the petition against pretrial detention for the press gifts case was accepted today, Mubarak can no longer be held in custody in connection with any of the four cases pending against him, which means he will be released.

Does this mean that Mubarak has been acquitted in the corruption cases?

No. The three corruption cases in connection with which the court ordered Mubarak’s release are still pending; no conviction or acquittal has been issued. Mubarak has simply been temporarily released until the trials are concluded.

Can the Public Prosecution order Mubarak’s continued detention?

After the court accepted Mubarak’s petition today against his pretrial detention and ordered his release, the Public Prosecution can appeal this ruling. At this point, it is up to the court: either accept the prosecution’s appeal and overturn the previous order to release Mubarak or reject the prosecution’s appeal and uphold the temporary release order.

Does Mubarak’s release mean that he cannot be placed in pretrial detention again?

No. The judicial investigating bodies in the cases still pending against Mubarak may issue new pretrial detention orders if the proper conditions are met. However, the prosecutor cannot order him detained beyond the maximum term of pretrial detention allowed in these cases, as illustrated by the killing of demonstrators case.

What conditions must be met for the courts to place Mubarak in pretrial detention in the future?

Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court may remand a defendant while the case is pending in the following cases: If the defendant, accused of a felony or misdemeanor carrying prison time, has no known residence in Egypt, or if the defendant is accused of a felony or misdemeanor that carries a sentence of at least one year imprisonment, the evidence against him is sufficient and any of the following conditions apply:

  • If the crime is apprehended while being committed, in which case the sentence must be executed immediately upon issuance.
  • If there are fears that the defendant might flee the jurisdiction.
  • If there are fears that the investigation will be harmed, either through influencing the victims or witnesses, evidence tampering or collusion with other perpetrators to change or suppress the facts.
  • To prevent a breakdown in public security and order that may result due to the gravity of the crime.

Why has Mubarak’s trial lasted for more than two years?

Egyptian law sets no time limit for trials, and they may go on for several years. The law only defines the maximum period for which defendants may be held in pretrial detention, setting limits on these terms in consideration of the violation of personal liberties it entails.

Have the investigating bodies played a role in extending the length of the trial?

Of course. The Public Prosecution files criminal charges and brings the evidence to support the defendant’s conviction. The Public Prosecution was slow to charge Mubarak. The public prosecutor at the time, Abd al-Megid Mahmoud, only ordered an investigation into Mubarak on 10 April 2011—that is, two months after he stepped down—after massive popular pressure in the form of huge demonstrations dubbed the Friday of Prosecution and Purging. Until that date, all charges had been filed against Mubarak’s interior minister, Habib al-Adli, and his deputies and other ministers and regime leaders in financial corruption cases.

When the Public Prosecution charged Mubarak with participating in the murder of demonstrators in the January 2011 events, influence peddling and profiting from gas export to Israel, all these charges were joined in one case. The other cases were opened later and have not yet been brought to trial.

Did the Public Prosecution play a role in the way the prosecution of Mubarak was handled?

Yes. The Public Prosecution has jurisdiction over investigations; based on its investigations, it either charges the defendant, closes the case or rules that there are no grounds for a case.

The Public Prosecution is also the charging authority. As such, if it files formal charges, it must present all the substantiating evidence on which the court will base its judgment. The more hard evidence the prosecution submits, the easier it is for the court to issue its judgment. Conversely, the weaker the evidence, the more likely the defendants are to escape punishment.

The Public Prosecution only brought criminal cases against Mubarak on largely trivial charges in four cases, although many citizens submitted numerous complaints with supporting evidence.

Moreover, as the representative of the people, the Public Prosecution can file a criminal case without any citizen complaint. Nevertheless, it did not charge with Mubarak with further crimes beyond these four cases.

As EIPR learned when representing some victims in the murder of demonstrators case, the investigations were severely flawed and the evidence brought by the prosecutor was tenuous. As a result, the grounds for conviction were weak and the conviction was overturned.

What role did state agencies play in the course of Mubarak’s trial?

In the case of the killing of demonstrators—in which EIPR represented some martyrs’ families—state agencies did not cooperate with the Public Prosecution in obtaining conclusive evidence. For example, General Intelligence sent the Public Prosecution videotapes devoid of evidence, telling the prosecution that other tapes relevant to early February had been “taped over.” Similarly, the police destroyed important criminal evidence in the same case: a CD containing incoming and outgoing telephone calls from the operations room of the Central Security Forces. The Public Prosecution brought a criminal case against the officer responsible for destroying the evidence, and he was sentenced to two years in prison.

Will the current events have an impact on the prosecution of Mubarak for the murder of demonstrators?

It is well established that the judge does not rule based on his personal knowledge, but rather based on the case file. After the fall of Muslim Brotherhood rule, Mubarak’s defense will likely shift the blame to them, especially after the verdict issued in the prison escape from Wadi al-Natron Prison. The judgment in that case is consistent with and buttresses the testimony given by Omar Suleiman, the former vice-president, in the Mubarak trial, when he stated that demonstrators were killed by “foreign elements” cooperating with the Muslim Brothers.

As for the financial corruption cases, often these cases are settled when the amount in question is returned.

When will Mubarak’s trial for the killing of demonstrators resume?

The next session is scheduled for 25 August. Mubarak will be obligated to attend, even if he has been released.
Tags

  • ALSO BY THIS AUTHOR

    • Harvard AAUP on Termination of CMES Leadership

      Harvard AAUP on Termination of CMES Leadership

      The Executive Committee of AAUP-Harvard Faculty Chapter condemns the abrupt termination of the leadership of Harvard’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES): Professor Cemal Kafadar as Director and Associate Professor Rosie Bsheer as Associate Director. Though both Kafadar and Bsheer will retain their regular faculty positions, this summary dismissal of two leading Middle East scholars from their administrative positions is a political infringement on academic freedom and the autonomy of professors to shape intellectual agendas in their areas of research, teaching, and programming expertise.

    • Long Form Podcast Episode 4: Why the U.S. Media & Democrats Won’t Save Anyone (3 April)

      Long Form Podcast Episode 4: Why the U.S. Media & Democrats Won’t Save Anyone (3 April)

      In this episode of Long Form Podcast, Laila Al-Arian, Assal Rad, and Sana Saeed address the role of corporate media and the Democratic party in enabling Israel’s Genocide and paving the way for many of Trump’s policies. Speakers also address the Democrats’ double standard on ethnic cleansing in Palestine.

    • Teaching Palestine Today: Liberal Arts Context

      Teaching Palestine Today: Liberal Arts Context

      Join our first session of “Teaching Palestine Today” series. This session addresses the “Liberal Arts Context,” with Lara Deeb, Heather Ferguson, Amanda Lagji, and Leila Mansouri, moderated by Bassam Haddad. Four faculty members at the Claremont Colleges, a liberal arts consortium, discuss their approaches to including material on Palestine and Palestinian perspectives into classes in anthropology, history, postcolonial and decolonial literature, and creative writing. Topics addressed include classroom approaches, syllabi scaffolding, and strategies for building support beyond the classroom.
Feb 16, 2011 Lebanon
Jadaliyya Reports By :
Jadaliyya Reports

Past is Present: Settler Colonialism Matters!

On 5-6 March 2011, the Palestine Society at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London will hold its seventh annual conference, "Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine." This year`s conference aims to understand Zionism as a settler colonial project which has, for more than a century, subjected Palestine and Palestinians to a structural and violent form of destruction, dispossession, land appropriation and erasure in the pursuit of a new Jewish Israeli society. By organizing this conference, we hope to reclaim and revive the settler colonial paradigm and to outline its potential to inform and guide political strategy and mobilization.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often described as unique and exceptional with little resemblance to other historical or ongoing colonial conflicts. Yet, for Zionism, like other settler colonial projects such as the British colonization of Ireland or European settlement of North America, South Africa or Australia, the imperative is to control the land and its resources -- and to displace the original inhabitants. Indeed, as conference keynote speaker Patrick Wolfe, one of the foremost scholars on settler colonialism and professor at La Trobe University in Victoria, Australia, argues, "the logic of this project, a sustained institutional tendency to eliminate the Indigenous population, informs a range of historical practices that might otherwise appear distinct--invasion is a structure not an event."[i]

Therefore, the classification of the Zionist movement as a settler colonial project, and the Israeli state as its manifestation, is not merely intended as a statement on the historical origins of Israel, nor as a rhetorical or polemical device. Rather, the aim is to highlight Zionism`s structural continuities and the ideology which informs Israeli policies and practices in Palestine and toward Palestinians everywhere. Thus, the Nakba -- whether viewed as a spontaneous, violent episode in war, or the implementation of a preconceived master plan -- should be understood as both the precondition for the creation of Israel and the logical outcome of Zionist settlement in Palestine.

Moreover, it is this same logic that sustains the continuation of the Nakba today. As remarked by Benny Morris, “had he [David Ben Gurion] carried out full expulsion--rather than partial--he would have stabilised the State of Israel for generations.”[ii] Yet, plagued by an “instability”--defined by the very existence of the Palestinian nation--Israel continues its daily state practices in its quest to fulfill Zionism’s logic to maximize the amount of land under its control with the minimum number of Palestinians on it. These practices take a painful array of manifestations: aerial and maritime bombardment, massacre and invasion, house demolitions, land theft, identity card confiscation, racist laws and loyalty tests, the wall, the siege on Gaza, cultural appropriation, and the dependence on willing (or unwilling) native collaboration and security arrangements, all with the continued support and backing of imperial power. 

Despite these enduring practices however, the settler colonial paradigm has largely fallen into disuse. As a paradigm, it once served as a primary ideological and political framework for all Palestinian political factions and trends, and informed the intellectual work of committed academics and revolutionary scholars, both Palestinians and Jews.

The conference thus asks where and why the settler colonial paradigm was lost, both in scholarship on Palestine and in politics; how do current analyses and theoretical trends that have arisen in its place address present and historical realities? While acknowledging the creativity of these new interpretations, we must nonetheless ask: when exactly did Palestinian natives find themselves in a "post-colonial" condition? When did the ongoing struggle over land become a "post-conflict" situation? When did Israel become a "post-Zionist" society? And when did the fortification of Palestinian ghettos and reservations become "state-building"?

In outlining settler colonialism as a central paradigm from which to understand Palestine, this conference re-invigorates it as a tool by which to analyze the present situation. In doing so, it contests solutions which accommodate Zionism, and more significantly, builds settler colonialism as a political analysis that can embolden and inform a strategy of active, mutual, and principled Palestinian alignment with the Arab struggle for self-determination, and indigenous struggles in the US, Latin America, Oceania, and elsewhere.

Such an alignment would expand the tools available to Palestinians and their solidarity movement, and reconnect the struggle to its own history of anti-colonial internationalism. At its core, this internationalism asserts that the Palestinian struggle against Zionist settler colonialism can only be won when it is embedded within, and empowered by, the broader Arab movement for emancipation and the indigenous, anti-racist and anti-colonial movement--from Arizona to Auckland.

SOAS Palestine Society invites everyone to join us at what promises to be a significant intervention in Palestine activism and scholarship.

For over 30 years, SOAS Palestine Society has heightened awareness and understanding of the Palestinian people, their rights, culture, and struggle for self-determination, amongst students, faculty, staff, and the broader public. SOAS Palestine society aims to continuously push the frontiers of discourse in an effort to make provocative arguments and to stimulate debate and organizing for justice in Palestine through relevant conferences, and events ranging from the intellectual and political impact of Edward Said`s life and work (2004), international law and the Palestine question (2005), the economy of Palestine and its occupation (2006), the one state (2007), 60 Years of Nakba, 60 Years of Resistance (2009), and most recently, the Left in Palestine (2010).

For more information on the SOAS Palestine Society 7th annual conference, Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine: www.soaspalsoc.org

SOAS Palestine Society Organizing Collective is a group of committed students that has undertaken to organize annual academic conferences on Palestine since 2003.

 

[i] Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event, Cassell, London, p. 163

[ii] Interview with Benny Morris, Survival of the Fittest, Haaretz, 9. January 2004, http://cosmos.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/php/art.php?aid=5412